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Rebalancing the Economy
and Reforming the Fiscal System
of the People’s Republic of China
By Roy Bahl 1

Following the 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China in October 2017, the 13th
National People’s Congress (the national legislature
of the People’s Republic of China [PRC]) and
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
were held in March 2018. The National People’s
Congress amended the Constitution, endorsed a
government reorganization, laid out an economic
and social program meant to move toward achieving
the goals of high-quality and cleaner economic
growth, and adopted a focus on human well-being
and reduced disparities within the PRC. The State
Council’s “Report on the Work of Government”
provided considerably more detail on the goals
and objectives of the program but stopped short of
identifying most of the specific policy interventions
that are to come.2
The fact that about 85% of all government
expenditures in the PRC pass through provincial
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and local government budgets makes it clear that
reforms in the intergovernmental fiscal structure
will play a role in this program. The goal in this
note is to lay out and discuss a package of reforms
that could be consistent with the objectives of
the government. The fiscal instruments that we
consider here include the division of expenditure
responsibilities, subnational government taxation,
intergovernmental transfers, user charges,
borrowing powers, and financial management
practices.

Why a Change in Government Policy?
The performance of the PRC’s economy has been
the envy of the world during the past three decades.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased
10% per year over three consecutive decades,
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The government
plans to increase
expenditures
(particularly for
social services) and
the flow of transfers
to subnational
governments, and
pledges to keep the
fiscal deficit low.

tax revenues increased from 10.6% of GDP in 1994
to 21% in 2016, infrastructure was modernized,
and nearly 500 million people were lifted out of
poverty. Large cities in the PRC even have income
levels comparable to some member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.3
But rapid economic growth and urbanization
have also brought challenges. The growth rate of
the PRC’s economy is expected to slow by 2020,
which will limit the fiscal surplus needed to address
expenditure needs, including environmental
protection, social security costs, and the provision
of infrastructure and basic services. In addition,
urbanization, which has already brought 260 million
migrants from rural areas, will continue to swell
the size of cities over the next decade. This will
further increase the demand for housing, public
infrastructure, and local public services. Most of
the burden for providing these services will fall on
provincial and local governments.
In addition, the government sees the goal of
sustainable long-term growth as calling out for a
rebalancing of the economy with more emphasis
on increased private investment and productivity,
more innovation, adoption of new technologies,
removal of barriers that hold back efficient
allocation of resources, greater concern for an
improved quality of life, increased density in city
populations, a reduction in regional inequalities,
poverty alleviation, and meeting the needs of an
aging population. Achieving these goals will require
not only funding but some sweeping institutional
changes. The State Council has already called for
a large number of important reforms in the public
sector delivery system and in its incentive package
for private sector economic development.
The government plans to increase expenditures
(particularly for social services) and the flow of
transfers to subnational governments, and pledges
to keep the fiscal deficit low. But on the revenue
side, the emphasis seems to be on cuts in taxes,
user charges, and government administrative fees,
with the goal of stimulating economic activity
and growing the tax base. There is an intention to
introduce a property tax, but little else by way of
proposed new tax actions. The risks inherent in the
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intergovernmental fiscal system, notably borrowing
by subnational governments, are being addressed
by regulation on requirements for the issuance of
new debt rather than by instituting a hard budget
constraint on subnational governments. So, at
this point, the likely changes in the institutional
structuring for delivering services and financing
them are more speculative than they are based on
government announcements.

Possible Changes in the
Intergovernmental Fiscal Structure
Certain possible reforms in the intergovernmental
fiscal structure are consistent with the objectives
of high-quality economic growth and the
improvement of human well-being in the PRC.
Some of these changes would involve more fiscal
decentralization and some would lead to more fiscal
centralization. Most are in the mode of offering
subnational government leaders more autonomy
in choosing their fiscal strategy but with incentives
to make choices that are consistent with central
government objectives. An alternative approach to
sweeping institutional change would be to maintain
the present intergovernmental fiscal structure and
meet the desired objectives with mandates on
service levels, as well as direct interventions in the
expenditure regime such as conditional transfers or
changes in budgeting practices.

Reassign Expenditure Responsibilities

The PRC is probably the most decentralized
country in the world in terms of the expenditure
responsibility it assigns to subnational governments.
About 85% of all government expenditures
are accounted for in subnational government
budgets. This is twice the level in decentralized
countries such as Canada and the United States.
Best international practice and even intuition
would seem to suggest that this share of central
government is too small to accommodate
expenditures with redistributive goals, or on social
protection, or services characterized by significant
externalities. Both internal and external students of
Chinese economic policy have called out this issue.4

World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China. 2014. Urban China:
Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization. Washington, DC: World Bank.
J. Lou. 2013. Rethinking of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. [In Chinese]. Beijing: Financial and Economics Publishing
House; J. Martinez-Vazquez and B. Qiao. 2011. Assessing the Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities. In J. Man and Y-H.
Hong, eds. China’s Public Finance in Transition. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, pp. 21–40; and footnote 3.
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The PRC follows an unusual policy of assigning
responsibility for social insurance, including
pensions and health, to the lowest-level subnational
governments. As often argued, this level of
decentralization may not be sustainable for all social
insurance functions because of the high level of risk
pooling required and redistribution considerations.5
Moreover, portability of benefits (i.e., structuring
common job benefits such that they are not tied
to a specific employer or location) could make
the spatial allocation of labor and investment
more efficient. Some degree of provincial sharing
is already underway, but a final solution, perhaps
one that features full centralization of financing, is
probably some years away.
A longstanding problem with expenditure
assignments in the PRC is the overlap between the
roles of the government and the market in allocating
factor resources. Subnational governments allocate
significant funds to state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), in some cases competing with the private
sector, and the number of locally owned SOEs
has been growing. The opportunity cost of these
subsidies is an increased level of local public
services or a reduction in taxes, and a result of
propping up unprofitable enterprises is a less
efficient allocation of resources and perhaps a
drag on the economy. The problem has been
exacerbated by the use of public enterprises as a
channel for issuing new bonds, risking unsustainable
debt levels. A reasonable reform that has long
been embraced by the central government is
for subnational governments to begin shedding
themselves of ownership of SOEs, as was mandated
by the State Council in 2005. The State Council
again in 2014 called for a clearer separation
between the market and government and an end to
preferential subsidies.
Finally, the complexity of regional
development requires the central government’s
direct involvement. Particularly in areas such as
transportation, pollution control, and water resource
management, the benefits and costs associated with
public service delivery spill over the boundaries of
even large metropolitan governments, as evidenced
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by discussions about creating “mega regions” with
more authority over planning. Important examples
include regional planning and service delivery in the
Beijing-Tianjin-Hubei urban region and the Yangtze
River Economic Belt, and in integrated water
resource management and eco-compensation for
the Yangtze River. The implementation of such
regional plans is constrained because expenditure
assignments are unclear and incentives for
interregional cooperation are not in place. The need
to connect cities within regions and within the
country therefore requires significant central
intervention.

Intergovernmental Transfers

The PRC’s approach to intergovernmental transfers
has fit well into its investment-led economic
growth strategy. The present system has two major
components. The first is a derivation-based revenue
sharing system that provides a strong incentive to
invest in infrastructure that will attract industry
and expand existing enterprises.6 The second is
conditional (earmarked) grants that are aimed at
supporting the lagging regions and compensating
those that have been harmed by national policies.
Virtually all revenues of provincial and local
governments come from these sources.
The revenue sharing system is financed using
a fixed percentage claim on central government
tax revenues that is transferred to provinces. It is
an entitlement program of sorts for subnational
governments, even though the sharing rates are
frequently changed by the central government.
The distribution among provinces is determined by
point of collection of the revenues. The derivationbased system has supported the economic
development goals of the state, and has helped
stimulate revenue mobilization, especially in coastal
regions. It has been reinforced by a reward system
for appointed subnational government officials that
favors economic development investments over
human capital investments.
The conditional grants system is complicated
by significant compliance and administrative costs.
While it once included over 200 different grant

R. Bahl, C-C. Goh, and B. Qiao. 2014. Reforming the Public Finance System to Fit a More Urbanized China. [In Chinese and
English]. Beijing: Financial and Economic Publishing House; R. Bahl and J. Martinez-Vazquez. 2006. Fiscal Federalism and
Economic Reform in China. In J. Wallack and T.N. Srinivasan, eds. Federalism and Economic Reform: International Perspectives.
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–300; Y. Liu, J. Martinez-Vazquez, and B. Qiao. 2014. Falling Short:
Intergovernmental Transfers in China. Public Finance and Management. 15 (4). p. 374; and footnote 3.
A derivation-based tax sharing system is one where the amount in transfers received by a region is proportionate to the share
of taxes collected there. A discussion of the pros and cons of derivation-based tax sharing can be found in R. Bahl and R. Bird.
2018. Fiscal Decentralization and Local Finance in Developing Countries: Development From Below. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing. Chapter 7.
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...the present system
for intergovernmental
transfers is not in step
with the new economy
that is envisaged for
the PRC.

programs, this number has recently been declining
and the State Council called for further reductions
in 2018. Conditional grants account for about onethird of total subnational government expenditures.
But the present system for intergovernmental
transfers is not in step with the new economy that
is envisaged for the PRC. There are three major
concerns. First, the incentives in the present system
lean toward economic development spending at the
expense of investment in social services. Second,
the prospect that shares of value-added tax and
income tax collections from existing enterprises
will continue may discourage investment in newer
plants and facilities and therefore slow productivity
growth. Third, derivation-based revenue sharing
runs contrary to the goals of fiscal equalization.
Provinces with a higher per capita GDP receive
significantly larger per capita amounts of shared tax
transfers.
Neither do conditional grants fit the new
development strategy, in part because they are
costly to comply with and their effectiveness is
uncertain. As mentioned, they are increasingly in
decline.
The objectives of the government include
formulating a plan for reforming the division of
revenues and improving the transfer payment
system, but no details have yet been given. In this
respect, two basic strategies might be considered.
The first is to patch up the present system to
better fit the new economic and social goals, and
postpone comprehensive reform to a later period.
This might be done in a number of ways, including
the following:
•
Establish a new, more effective equalization
grant that channels more funds to poorer
regions. The grant might be funded by a
reduction in the percent share of central
tax revenues in the vertical pool for general
revenue sharing, and/or a further reduction in
conditional grants. More equalization might
also be achieved by reassigning responsibility
for social security expenditures to the central
government level.
•
The incentive system for appointed
government officials might be revisited
to reward social benefit spending and
environmental controls.

7

•

Performance grants might be introduced to
reward provinces where the provisions of the
new budget law are more fully implemented.

The other approach is to move toward an
intergovernmental transfer system that better
fits the new strategy for economic and social
development. One possibility would be to replace
derivation-based sharing with a formula grant
distribution. This would both remove the bias
against social service spending—since the amount
of revenue received would no longer be linked to the
amount of revenue collected—and open the door
for creating a more equalizing system. The latter
could be accomplished by making the distribution
formula needs-based. It would also make local
officials more open to the idea of abandoning less
efficient SOEs. However, a needs-based grant
system, if it were not accompanied by new local
taxation powers, would weaken the incentives for
increased revenue mobilization.7
Both approaches to restructuring the
intergovernmental transfer system would impose
significant transition costs and would need to
be phased in. Moreover, both would result in a
redistribution of revenues. Some provinces would
be winners, raising the question about how to
properly absorb the new revenues, while some
would be losers, raising the question about how to
fill the ensuing revenue gap.

Local Government Revenues

Local governments in the PRC have no taxation
powers. All revenues are derived from shares of
central government taxes. However, the economic
and social program presented by the State Council
in 2018 may open some new doors. The central
government has committed to reviewing the
revenue powers of subnational governments and
has announced that it plans to introduce legislation
to enable local property taxation in 2018.
The case for autonomous local taxation in the
PRC would seem a good one, at least in the larger
cities, and it is in step with the economic and social
policy program of the government. In many cases,
urban public service levels are better than in the
rest of the country and urban income levels are
higher, so paying a higher tax price in cities could

R. Bahl, C-C. Goh, and B. Qiao. 2014. Reforming the Public Finance System to Fit a More Urbanized China. [In Chinese and
English]. Beijing: Financial and Economic Publishing House.
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be an efficient and equitable solution. Such an
arrangement might be seen as a kind of quasi user
charge for urban public services.
There are good options for local government
taxes in the PRC, particularly in provincial cities
and large metropolitan areas. Property values have
grown and this is likely to continue with more
urbanization. Additional revenues from an annual
tax on property values could easily contribute
another 1% of GDP. Other property-related
financing instruments could be revenue productive,
including property transfer taxes and various
forms of value capture.8 But success with land and
property taxation in the PRC will depend on the kind
of taxation the government decides on, which has
not been announced yet.
Another option is to impose significant new
taxes on the ownership and use of motor vehicles.
The number of motor vehicles is growing faster
than the population in the PRC and this imposes
an infrastructure cost and external costs associated
with congestion and pollution. Taxes on motor
vehicles might be a way to reduce or recapture
some of these heavy external costs. This might
be done with increased tax prices on motor fuels
in large cities, significantly higher motor vehicle
registration fees in urban areas, tolls, and parking
charges.
The largest metropolitan local governments
might even be able to impose a broad-based
income or sales tax, as is done in many Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
countries. This might be done by piggybacking
on the base of the central government tax with
each local government given some authority to
set a rate within certain limits (footnote 7). Such
an arrangement could be revenue productive
depending on the rate chosen. The administration
would remain with the central government. The
piggyback tax might be viewed as a charge for
services received in an urban area, and it could be a
way to make local leadership more accountable to
the local population.
If the intergovernmental transfer system were
restructured along the lines discussed above, as
a needs-based grant, revenue “losers” could be
compensated by authorization to impose certain
local taxes. This might both ease the transition to a
new transfer system and lead to more equalization
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in the distribution of transfers. The end result would
be a higher tax price paid by residents in urban
areas for better quality services. Moving toward
full cost recovery on traditional user charges could
complement this approach. On the other hand,
authorization for local governments to impose taxes
or increase user charges might conflict with the
supply-side approach to economic development
advanced by the central government, which
includes reductions in the taxes, user charges,
benefit program contributions, and administrative
fees that now burden businesses.

Borrowing

The PRC has long tried to accommodate the
mismatch between the very restricted borrowing
power of provincial and local governments and the
heavy responsibility placed on them for financing
infrastructure. To meet their capital financing needs,
local governments have turned to agents who
borrow on their behalf, known variously as “urban
development investment companies (UDICs)”,
“special purpose finance vehicles,” or “financing
platforms”. UDICs are capitalized by the local
governments, mostly with user rights to land that
was purchased from rural collectives (farmers) and
converted to state-owned status. The UDICs then
borrow to finance the infrastructure improvements
necessary to lease the land, using the expected
revenue stream from the land leases as collateral.
Half of the outstanding debt of subnational
governments is borrowing by UDICs. According
to draft financing components submitted to
the World Bank in 2013, about two-thirds of this
debt is guaranteed by the local governments
(the guarantee status on the other one third is
uncertain).
Because of the risks embodied in this approach,
the budget law was revised in 2014 and 2015 to allow
subnational government borrowing through the
provincial governments, subject to the ceiling set by
the central government and approval by provincial
governments. However, much of this borrowing
remains off-budget, with the result that quotas
or limits can be circumvented, and contingent
liabilities are not fully known. The revised budget
law also included various policies to close
“backdoors” and the central government tried to
build a warning system to help local governments

M. Smolka. 2013. Implementing Value Capture in Latin America: Policies and Tools for Urban Development. Cambridge,
MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

5

There are good
options for local
government taxes in
the PRC, particularly
in provincial
cities and large
metropolitan areas.

6

The Governance Brief

The budget structure
of subnational
governments does not
lend itself to objective
analysis and evaluation
of fiscal practices.

avoid an insolvency problem. But this reform,
even though it goes in the right direction, does
not significantly affect the borrowing incentive
of local governments, and the ”backdoors” have
not disappeared as expected.9 In addition, it still
leaves open the questions of where subnational
governments will find the revenues to repay their
loans, and what will happen if they do not repay
them. At least in the case of cities, authorizing local
governments to impose taxes could address the
affordability issue of local government borrowing.

Financial Management Practices

In September 2014, the PRC’s legislature adopted
a revision to the budget law, issuing directives to
implement reform of the budget and management
system. This marked the first revision to the law
since 1995, a time when government policy was
heavily influenced by planned economy concepts.
Discussion in the PRC about “modernizing” the
fiscal system was to a large extent about the abuse
of power by subnational governments, and the new
budget law was intended to address this issue.10
Local governments circumvent their hard
budget constraints through ad hoc fiscal policies.
This has been done by granting local firms
preferential treatment via access to fiscal subsidies,
tax exemptions, and credit, and by using SOEs
as off-budget vehicles to finance public services
or investments for higher GDP growth. These
backdoor fiscal practices have been enabled by,
among other things, an unclear boundary between
the state and the market at the local level and may
have been perpetuated by nontransparent financial
reporting.

9
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The budget structure of subnational
governments does not lend itself to objective
analysis and evaluation of fiscal practices.
Subnational government budgets in the PRC
have four accounts, or sub-budgets: the public
finance budget (which is the general account),
the government fund budget, the social security
budget, and the SOE operating account. There is
no consolidated budget that fully reconciles these
accounts. In addition, separate off-budget accounts
are kept for public service units, public enterprises,
SOEs, and financing platforms. The financial records
of sub-provincial government budgets have not
been released since 2011.
Other issues have limited the full
implementation of the State Council regulations.
For one, the message from government about the
use of off-budget sources of finance has not been
clear. Neither has the practice of giving preferential
tax treatments and rebates been eliminated. In 2015,
the State Council put a hold on the elimination of
existing preferential tax treatments due to growth
slowdown and significant opposition to some of the
regulations.11
Though progress in implementing features
of the new budget law have been stalled in some
areas, the State Council regulations have set good
directives for constraining subnational government
budgets. They aim at improving the allocation
of resources in ways consistent with the plan for
higher quality development. Furthermore, they
level the playing field between public sector and
private sector investors, make budget decisions
more transparent, and move the fiscal system a step
closer to being rule-based.

Local governments in the PRC have a history of using “backdoor” approaches to financing infrastructure (i.e., finding ways
around restrictive laws that limit their financing options). In the 1990s, they used extrabudgetary revenues and expenditures;
in the 2000s, they borrowed through local corporations. In both cases, the central government waited some time
before closing these backdoor approaches. This is explored further in R. Bahl. 1999. Fiscal Policy in China: Taxation and
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. San Francisco, CA: 1990 Institute and University of Michigan Press; and C. Wong. 2013.
Paying for Urbanization in China: Challenges of China’s Municipal Finance in the Twenty-First Century. In R. Bahl, J. Linn, and
D. Wetzel, eds. Government Finance in Metropolitan Areas in Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy. pp. 273–308.
For a discussion of the State Council regulations, and provincial reactions, see footnote 3 and R. Bahl, C-C. Goh and B. Qiao.
2016. Financial Management in Shandong Province. [In Chinese and English]. Beijing: Financial and Economic Publishing House.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. Notice Regarding Certain Matters Related to Various Taxes and Other
Preferential Policies (Guofa [2015] No. 25). Beijing.
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Conclusions
The PRC has outgrown its intergovernmental
fiscal system. While during the last 25 years, the
incentives in place to support an investment-led
economic development strategy were on the mark,
the strategy of focusing resources on regions with
the most growth potential was effective, and even
the backdoor approaches to financing needed
infrastructure accomplished important objectives,
things have changed. The Chinese leadership
envisions a new model of economic and social
development with higher quality growth that will
be more consumption- than investment-led;
cleaner economic policies, with more innovation
and adoption of new technologies; competition
between public and private enterprises on a more
level playing field; increased job opportunities; more
emphasis on a higher quality of life for citizens; and
less interregional disparity in access to good public
services. The existing system of expenditure and
revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfers,
and subnational government borrowing may not be
a good fit with this economic and social model.
In the short run, the PRC proposes to follow
a supply-side macroeconomic fiscal policy that

will support GDP growth of about 6.5% in 2018.
This will include about CNY800 billion in tax cuts;
reductions in business payments for employee
benefits, user charges, and administrative fees; and
the removal of some government regulatory barriers
to new business development and factor mobility.
These reductions in the cost of doing business
should stimulate and help rebalance the economy.
On the expenditure side, significant increases in
social services spending are proposed.
But the necessary reforms in the longer run will
be much more difficult and will need to overcome
well-entrenched positions on all of the pillars of
intergovernmental fiscal relations—expenditure
assignment, local government revenue mobilization,
transfers, and borrowing. There is no single
magic bullet for this. Virtually the whole of the
intergovernmental system will need to be revamped
to get PRC’s public finances in sync with its new
economic objectives.
This article was peer-reviewed by Ying Qian, Director,
and Hans van Rijn, Principal Public Management
Specialist, East Asia Public Management and Finance
Division, Asian Development Bank.

7

The PRC has
outgrown its
intergovernmental
fiscal system.

8

The Governance Brief

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
© 2019 ADB. The CC license does not apply to non-ADB copyright materials in this publication.
https://www.adb.org/terms-use#openaccess

http://www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda

ISBN 978-92-9261-512-3 (print), 978-92-9261-513-0 (electronic)

pubsmarketing@adb.org

ISSN 2520-6591 (print), 2520-6605 (electronic)

https://www.adb.org/publications/series/governance-briefs

Publication Stock No. BRF190015

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/BRF190015

Note: ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China.

Printed on recycled paper

